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The Everett Interpretation of Quantum Mechanics. Collected Works 1955-1980 with Commentary. 
By Hugh Everett III. Ed. by Jeffrey A. Barrett and Peter Byrne. 
This book is essential reading for anyone interested in the Everett interpretation of quantum 
mechanics, and in particular in Everett's own work. Recent years have seen a huge interest in 
Everett's theory, both from the point of view of new developments within an Everettian framework, 
and from that of the history of the theory and the biography of Everett. The first kind of 
developments have included the recognition that decoherence can play a crucial role in Everett's 
theory (as argued especially by Hans-Dieter Zeh, Simon Saunders and David Wallace); and the flurry 
of work on probability in Everettian quantum mechanics (in particular the decision-theoretic 
approach advanced by David Deutsch and David Wallace), and the intense debate it sparked. The 
second kind of developments  have included the details of the genesis of Everett's theory against the 
background of Wheeler's doomed attempts to obtain Bohr's blessing for it (first investigated by 
Stefano Osnaghi and co-workers); and the exhumation of Everett's papers from his son Mark 
Everett's basement, including Everett's drafts of his thesis, notes, and correspondence relating to the 
Bohr-Everett-Wheeler affair and the later reception of Everett's work, which together with further 
biographical research led to Peter Byrne's arguably definitive biography. 
This volume, edited by Jeffrey A. Barrett and Peter Byrne, is a commented edition of Everett's 
published works on quantum mechanics, of transcripts of comments and conversations by Everett,  
and of a fascinating selection of notes and other materials mostly from Mark Everett's basement, 
with three introductory chapters and extensive commentary and footnotes.  It provides the 
opportunity to read a variety of the sources behind the recent historical narratives on Everett (the 
originals are available in an on-line companion archive at UC Irvine, under the address 
http://hdl.handle.net/10575/1060 ). Further,  it gives access to Everett's original theory in its fullest 
form (who has read Everett's 'long thesis', or even his 'short thesis' within the last ten years?), 
including the entirety of the extant clarifications provided by Everett, especially in reaction to early 
misunderstandings of his theory, including by early champions like Bryce DeWitt.  
The book starts with three introductory chapters, one general, one biographical and one conceptual 
(Chapters 1-3): the Conceptual Introduction is especially interesting as a guide to understanding 
Everett's texts. There follow three 'minipapers' sent by Everett to Wheeler in the initial stages of  
work on his thesis, and a related letter by Wheeler to Everett  (Chapters 4-7) – Wigner 's friend and 
splitting amoebas looming large. Chapters 8, 9 and 10 are the long and short versions of Everett's 
thesis (as published in DeWitt and Graham's epochal collection and in Reviews of Modern Physics), 
and Wheeler's short article that accompanied publication of the latter. In reading the long thesis, 
one is struck by Everett's sheer genius and surefooting, by the elegance of his presentation, and by 
the richness of details and ideas, many of which seem ahead of time and get lost in the short thesis. 
Examples are Everett's chapter on information (80-95), his full discussion of composite systems and 
relative states (97-103), his clear statement of no-signalling (99), the informational treatment of the 
uncertainty principle (110), the lucid understanding of typicality, much earlier than one would 
expect from modern discussions (123-130), the treatment of approximate measurements, which 
also anticipates today's measurement theory (145-148) , the stab at Bohr on quantum jumps (151), 
and the insightful and up-to-date discussion of alternative approaches to quantum mechanics (151-
159).There follows some fascinating correspondence about the Bohr-Everett -Wheeler interaction 
and the early reception of the thesis (Chapters 11-18). Of particular note are five documents from 
May/June 1957: Wheeler's notes of his conversation with Bohr's assistant Aage Petersen  (207-210) 
;'AP ΀… s΁ays VoŶ N΀euŵaŶŶ΁ & Wig΀Ŷer΁ all ŶoŶseŶse…'Ϳ, and his letter to Alexander Stern  (219-
222), in both of which one sees how strongly and insightfully Wheeler supported Everett's ideas, at 
the same time thinking they were compatible with the Copenhagen interpretation; and Everett's 
letters to Petersen (who was a personal friend, 238-240), DeWitt (252-256) and E. T. Jaynes (261-
264), in which Everett makes very explicit remarks, respectively, about the Copenhagen 
interpretation, about branching and the relation between theory and reality, and about the role of 
Lebesgue measure in classical statistical mechanics. (I believe this letter to Jaynes may prove very 
significant to clarifying both Everett's views on typicality and the background role played by the 
concept of information in his theory.) Chapter 19 is an equally fascinating transcript of discussions of 
Everett's theory at a 1962 conference at Xavier University (where Boris Podolsky was based), 
followed by more notes and correspondence by Everett from the years 1970-1980 (Chapters 20-22 
and 24-25), in particular Everett's marginal notes to the original preprint of John S. Bell's "Quantum 
Theory for Cosmologists" (including one referring to branching going 'either way' in time, 287), and a 
letter to Max Jammer (294-298); and a tape recording of Everett and Charles Misner reminiscing 
together in 1977 (Chapter 23). A number of appendices (317-366) reproduce handwritten drafts and 
notes in Everett's thankfully legible hand. A final note, bibliography and detailed index conclude the 
volume (which is beautifully produced, except for a number of rather irritating misprints).   
It is a well-known fact that Everett has often been read as obscure, or at least not quite satisfactory 
on a number of points, in particular on what Barrett in the Conceptual Introduction calls the 
'determinate record problem' (less accurately 'preferred basis problem') and the 'probability 
problem'. Indeed, these perceived problems have originated some of the most interesting (and/or 
controversial) recent developments  in philosophy of quantum mechanics.  This volume offers a 
unique opportunity of reconsidering Everett's original theory on its own merits. The editorial 
introductions and notes are of great help in this regard. Indeed, Jeff Barrett is arguably the most 
insightful commentator of the 'true' Everett (cf.  also his papers quoted in the bibliography). From 
the following remarks, it should be clear that a historically accurate reading of Everett may usefully 
inform our current philosophical concerns. In such an integrated HPS perspective, the most 
interesting complex of problems connects the 'determinate record problem', 'empirical faithfulness' 
and the 'probability problem'. Everett clearly thought that any state can be picked to define states 
relative to it; some systems, however, have a complex enough structure that they can store (and 
perhaps act upon) memories of the relative states of systems they have interacted with in certain 
(measurement-like) ways; and the theory will be empirically successful if it predicts the standard 
quantum statistics for typical memory sequences of these observer systems.  
As to determinate records, the stability of memories is coached in the language of successive 
observer states (118), and it is explicit in Everett's discussion that quasi-classicality is aimed in part at 
elucidating aspects of observer systems (137). (Note that classicality is a central feature of 
observation according to the Copenhagen interpretation!) Technically, Everett relies on Ehrenfest's 
theorem (136-137), which we now know is not sufficient to ensure quasi-classicality. Nevertheless, I 
would argue the spirit of his discussion is the same as that of Everettians like Saunders and Wallace 
who use decoherence to select the diachronically stable structures ('worlds') whose content 
('records') is required to match the world of experience (cf. 46-50, and footnote bw on p. 137). 
As to empirical faithfulness, it is what Everett uses to characterise an empirically satisfactory theory 
(additional non-empirical factors such as simplicity, comprehensiveness, picturability, etc., further 
influencing theory choice). Although Everett devotes the second appendix of his long thesis to 
discussing the role of physical theorising (168-172), Everett's comments there are somewhat 
compressed, and Barrett tries to elucidate the notion in some detail (see esp. 50-54, and Barrett's 
papers). Everett is perhaps most explicit in his letter to DeWitt. He is clearly an empiricist of some 
sort, but the form of empirical adequacy he requires is: 'one accepts or rejects [a theory] on the 
basis of whether or not the experience which is predicted by the theory is in accord with actual 
experience' (253-254, Everett's emphasis). This takes full account of the fact that it is the theory that 
tells one what one can observe. Let me note a parallel with another empiricist approach to quantum 
mechanics, Van Fraassen's 'modal interpretation', in which any vector featuring in any arbitrary 
convex decomposition of the density operator of a system counts as a possible property of the 
system. The set of these possible properties is the same as the set of states of the system relative to 
states of the rest of the universe; and the analogue of the 'determinate record problem' in the 
modal interpretation also spurred a flurry of further work in the 1990s (although arguably less 
successful than the recent work on Everett). Barrett also attaches great importance to the 
correspondence between theory and reality being partial (e.g. in the comparison between Everett's 
understanding of his theory and DeWitt's, cf. footnote iu on p. 250). 
Finally, as to the probability problem, Everett's aim is to formulate 'wave mechanics without 
probability' (as his long thesis was originally titled, 17), basing instead his discussion on typicality 
(123-130 and 190-192). For him, this is a non-probabilistic notion (although one can use measure 
theory to define it, cf. also footnote dx on p. 191) that is basic even in classical statistical mechanics 
(cf. Everett's remarks to Jammer, 294-295, and especially his letter to Jaynes, 261-264). One may 
criticise the naturalness of the axioms employed by Everett in his derivation of the norm-squared 
measure as measure of typicality (but then, one may criticise also the naturalness of the Deutsch-
Wallace decision-theoretic axioms). But with respect to whether the typicality approach makes sense 
of our use of probability in quantum mechanics, I believe Everett's own approach deserves closer 
attention than it has standardly received. 
Guido Bacciagaluppi, University of Aberdeen 
 
